Categories
Legal, Laws, and Regs

Who keeps e-mails?

fishing expedition

If you’re following the BPI vs. ABC “pinkslime” lawsuit, than you might be aware that the company is attempting to subpoena emails from several journalists and food safety experts.

The subpoenas to Food Safety News reporters are a bit tricky, because the publisher for the online site is Bill Marler, who is providing pro bono legal defense for the two former USDA workers who are also being sued in this lawsuit. I’m not a lawyer, but this means attorney-client privilege to me. I’m surprised that the Judge would allow such a fishing expedition so close to this privilege, but maybe this is the way they do things in South Dakota’s courts.

Michele Simon responded to the subpoena, but as she noted, she doesn’t keep emails. Come to think of it, I don’t keep emails, either. Nowadays, when you have corporations shotgunning subpoenas under indifferent judicial eyes, perhaps none of us should keep emails. Not unless we primarily write about cats or JavaScript. Or the latest squabble between the WhatWG and the W3C HTML working groups (because no one would ever want any of these emails).

If BPI, Inc doesn’t have what it needs to to win its case, or can’t get it from those directly involved in the lawsuit, maybe it should focus on how to explain away both the pinkness and the slimy feel of its product when the defendant lawyers bring a mess in for the jury to fondle. And spend some time contemplating the fact that, yes, people in this country really do want to know what’s in the food we’re eating.

Update: ABC has also covered the subpoena story. Must have been a bit cathartic for them.

Categories
Documents Legal, Laws, and Regs

Who owns the law?

I follow several legal cases, most related to animal welfare, climate, the environment, or agriculture and food. Like others, I have a PACER account, which gives me access to most court documents at the federal level, but at a price. I’m not overfond of the cost, as I’ve noted in the past, but I am, at least, grateful for such simple access to the documents.

I also re-publish the documents for access by all, and that includes discovery material and and evidence exposed during a trial. If it’s posted by PACER, it’s public domain. When I pay for PACER I’m paying for access to the system, not the documents. So far, no cease and desist letters, knock on wood.

I also re-publish other interesting government produced documents I find. Most are from US agencies, but some are from states. So I was surprised when reading about the experiences of Carl Malamud, creator of Public.Resource.Org, when he was attempting to access statutes for several states. He recounts his experiences in the excellent article, Who owns the law? Technology reignites the war over just how public documents should be, in the June edition of the ABA Journal:

During the January hearing, Malamud spoke about how, during the past year, he has been targeted by opponents that have blurred the distinction between government entity and private organization. For example, state and local governments often contract private publishers like West or LexisNexis to produce and publish their official codes. In 2013, Georgia, Idaho and Mississippi asserted copyright protection after Malamud posted their laws on his website. “While it is clear that the law has no copyright, a few states have evidently not received the memo,” he says.

Idaho, for instance, claimed in its cease-and-desist letter that it owned a copyright in the “analyses, summaries and reference materials” contained in the annotated code. However, the state went one step further and claimed copyright protection for the native statutory content itself, stating that Malamud needed a license (which could be provided free of charge) if he wanted to use it on his website. Georgia also claimed copyright infringement, writing in its takedown letter that while “the state asserts no copyright in the statutory text itself,” Malamud allegedly copied annotated text, which the state claimed was copyrighted. Mississippi made a similar claim, noting that LexisNexis, which published the code, had provided a clean, unannotated copy of the code that was available for free.

To Malamud, that’s a false distinction. He says the codes are not independent endeavors by private companies but are, instead, clearly labeled as official state laws.

A copyright on state code? Impossible.

Sure enough, when I tried to pull up the Georgia state code, as linked from the official George state web site I get this—an assertion that I can access a free copy of the code, only if I acknowledge that the material is copyright the state of Georgia.

A copyright on state code? Oh, hell no.

If the state wants to allow a private entity to annotate the state code, then the private entity can provide a link to the annotated copy. It’s the state’s responsibility to provide direct access to the code without asserting any form of copyright that must be agreed to before the individual can access. The material is prepared with tax payer funds and therefore is public domain. More importantly, as Malamud notes, laws that impact on citizens must be freely available to the citizens.

Not just state laws, though. Malamud also posts standard organization regulations, and is currently involved in lawsuits related to the standards organizations’ claims of copyright. It brings up an interesting question: we can consider that a private entity has rights to material it produces, but what happens when the material it produces is referenced in laws?

The organizations claim that they shouldn’t lose their copyright just because the regulation is referenced in law, but Malamud notes that “Access to justice should not require a gold card.”

Or even a plain old bank debit card, which is what I use with PACER.

The ABA Journal article is a fascinating and informative read, especially for those interested in open document access.

For more on Malamud’s legal cases, the Electronic Frontier Foundation provides access to the court documents for the Sheet Metal and Air Conditional Contractors court case, and Archives.org provides access to the documents for the most recent American Educational Research Association case, uploaded via RECAP. I’m rummaging around for the court documents related to the American Society For Testing and Materials court case and counterclaim. Recent filings in both show them being reassigned from Judge Emmet Sullivan, a judge I’m very familiar with, to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan.

Categories
Legal, Laws, and Regs

Responding to Food Safety News editorial on the Vermont GMO laws

Also published at Food Safety News

In a May 3rd editorial , Food Safety News Editor Dan Flynn wrote a rather scathing editorial about Vermont’s new GMO labeling law. Among the criticisms he asked a question:

If there is some skilled member of the bar out there who has done the sort of professional analysis that is normally available, please send it to me. I truly would like to see it. I am certain this bill is a mess; I am just trying to figure out how messed up it is.

It’s hard to take a bill seriously that starts out with a screed. I am not a lawyer and don’t speak like one on TV, but Section 1 of H. 112 sounds like it was written by someone who might be off their meds. My guess is that this entire section has no impact whatsoever on law, but that the Vermont General Assembly likes to blow political smoke to make up for its inability to do more thorough work.

I’m not a member of the bar, sorry. I don’t even play a character on TV who is a member of the bar. You’ll just have to make do with an untrained opinion. Point of fact, most of us are untrained in the law, so we might as well muddle along on our own.

First, Dan mentioned the failure of California’s law related to downer livestock as an argument that, of course this bill will fail when challenged in court, as all such bills do. Before I address this particular reference, I did want to mention that California has been quite successful with recent laws that have been challenged in court, similar to how people see the Vermont law being challenged. It has been successful in defending the foie gras ban, the shark fin ban, as well as the state’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard. By all indications, California will also be successful with the recent challenge to its egg laws. I expect the Judge to support the state’s motion for dismissal, and the case to be over, quickly.

Returning to the California law related to the slaughter of “downer” livestock that Dan mentioned, the law was struck down because the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) explicitly preempts any state requirement “with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any [slaughterhouse] at which [federal] inspection is provided . . . which are in addition to, or different” than the federal requirements. (California’s Better Rule on Treatment of ‘Downer’ Pigs).

California’s downer law was in direct conflict with the federal law—an act precluded by the FMIA preemption clause. Even if the California law was complementary to FMIA, it still would be precluded because, as Justice Kagan noted, “The FMIA’s preemption clause sweeps widely…The clause prevents a State from imposing any additional or different―even if nonconflicting―requirements that fall within the FMIA’s scope and concern slaughterhouse facilities operations.”

The authority for the Supreme Court decision rests squarely within the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which states that federal law shall be the “supreme law of the land”. However, the Supremacy Clause doesn’t apply to the other state laws I just mentioned, because, as has been shown in court, none of the state laws are preempted by any existing federal law.

The Supremacy Clause doesn’t apply to Vermont’s law, either. Why? The Vermont law says it all:

No formal FDA policy on the labeling of genetically engineered foods has been adopted.

The FDA’s labeling guidelines related to GMOs are voluntary. Their purpose is to ensure uniformity and accuracy. Vermont requiring GMO labeling does not interfere with federal rules or regulations. The latter only kick in once the label has been so modified. And any preemption, expressed or implied, in the federal labeling laws (the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act), “shall not be construed to preempt any provision of state law, unless such provision is expressly preempted.” (Food Fight: FDA Preemption And Food Labeling Claims)

In other words, unless both laws expressly prohibit states from making laws related to GMO labeling, neither law preempts the state from doing so.

Dan’s editorial also references the Commerce Clause. I previously wrote about the Commerce Clause and its relationship to the California egg lawsuit. The Commerce Clause invests the federal government with the power to regulate commerce. However, it is the “dormant” Commerce Clause that’s at issue. The premise behind the “dormant” Commerce Clause is that states may not enact laws that purposely discriminate in favor of in-state producers against out-of-state producers. Since both in-state and out-of state producers have to follow the exact same law, and suffer the same economic considerations, I don’t see how the Vermont GMO law is discriminatory in nature.

What other kinds of legal challenges exist? In a recently released report titled, The Potential Impact of Mandatory Labeling for Genetically Engineered Food in the United States, the Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST) listed three legal challenges to mandatory GMO labeling. I’ve already touched on the first two (the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause), but the last is related to the First Amendment and the concept of enforced speech.

Washington Post article on the Vermont law notes that past court decisions have set up a four-part test to ascertain whether a restriction on commercial speech is allowed or not.

  • First, the court has to decide that the speech is protected, meaning it must be about legal activity and not be misleading.
  • Second, the government has to claim a substantial interest in limiting the speech.
  • Third, the policy in question has to “directly advance” that interest.
  • Fourth, that policy must not overreach in achieving its goal.

Careful reading of the Vermont law has shown that the lawmakers have established a substantial interest in enacting the label law, and that this law is the way to directly advance the interests of the people of Vermont. It has also shown that there is no other way of enacting such a law, since the FDA has shown no interests in mandatory labeling. Though issues related to Freedom of Speech are tricky, the state law’s wording demonstrates the lawmakers were well aware of potential Freedom of Speech issues, and drafted text accordingly.

Though I’m not a lawyer, I strongly believe the state will triumph against any court challenge. And members of the legal profession also believe this is so. A memorandum prepared by Emord & Associates goes into great detail as to why the firm believes that the Vermont GMO law will survive a Constitutional challenge:

This memorandum assesses the constitutionality of Vermont Bill H.112 (2013) as passed in the Vermont General Assembly. Because the Second Circuit applies the Zauderer exemption for compelled speech broadly, and the Bill protects consumer health and safety, the law is likely constitutional under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Furthermore, H.112 does not impede or conflict with the federal Food and Drug Administration’s labeling regime forfoods and dietary supplements. The federal system does not preempt H.112, which was enacted constitutionally under the State’s general powers. Finally, H.112does not discriminate against interstate commerce, or impose a burden that outweighs Vermont’s legitimate interest in protecting the consuming public. Thus, H.112 does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.

(After I turned over this text to Food Safety News, I found an additional legal resource on this law, the Vermont Law School Environmental and Natural Resources Clinic. It has also prepared a memorandum on the law. In addition, a lead sponsor of the law, Rep. Kate Webb, responded in comments to Dan Flynn’s editorial.)

But let’s put aside the legal mumbo jumbo since most of us aren’t lawyers. Let’s talk about the intent of the Vermont law.

The concerns about GMO as stated in the Vermont law are valid, whether they meet every individual’s interpretation of validity or not. Cross-pollination is a problem. Organic farmers are adversely impacted by nearby GMO crops. Though not mentioned in the Vermont law, there is concern about the unintended spread of proprietary seeds (“drift”) and the legal problems this has triggered.

We already know that GMO contamination has impacted on farmers producing crops for export, so there’s a major fiscal concern, too. In addition, GMO seeds also encourage poor farming practices: unsustainable development, rather than sustainable; monoculture over diverse agriculture.

Let’s also consider a presumption that GMOs have basically failed. The use of GMO has increased the need for water, rather than decrease it. They have failed in preventing overuse of herbicides, and expressly encourage the use of chemical pesticides. Because of reliance and encouragement on monoculture, they have failed to control pests in a sustainable manner. Because of the increased use of herbicides related to GMO crops, they have failed to control pests in such a way that the environment is not adversely impacted. And as the world has discovered, they’re not all that friendly to the pocketbook or local agricultural practices, either.

Finally, as to the issue of most importance to Dan, the issue of GMOs and food safety.

It is true that most studies and reports have not found a negative effect related to food safety from the use of GMO techniques. However, no publication, study, or report has noted a positive effect from GMO techniques, either. In the absolute best case, GMO’s impact on food safety is neutral. When we consider that the most we can hope for from a food safety perspective is no effect at all, even the possibility of negative effects—increased allergic reactions and other impacts—leads to an overall negative net effect on food safety. (Toxicity Studies of Genetically Modified Plants: A Review of the Published LiteraturePotentional Adverse Effects of Genetically Modified CropsWHO Biotechnology reports).

More importantly, the use of GMOs mask underlying problems. The Center for Food Safety notes this in relation to the discussion about using GMO to solve the Florida orange problem:

The GE “solution” might be attractive to many growers, producers, and curious consumers because it seems like a direct “fix”—by, for example, creating a citrus greening-resistant orange tree. But supporters of such technology continuously fail to acknowledge an important fact: this GE solution doesn’t address the root cause of the problem; it merely kicks the can down the road.

Marion Nestle said much the same thing in relation to “golden rice”, supposedly the cure for Vitamin A deficiency in certain parts of the world, when she wrote:

Taken together, the many nutritional, physiological, and cultural factors that affect vitamin A status suggest that the addition of a single nutrient to food will have limited effectiveness. Instead, a combination of supplementation, fortification, and dietary approaches is likely to be needed—approaches such as promoting the production and consumption of fruits and vegetables rich in beta-carotene, educating people about how to use such foods, and improving the quantity and variety of foods in the diet (so beta-carotene can be better absorbed). Perhaps most helpful would be basic public health measures such as providing adequate supplies of clean water (to prevent transmission of diarrheal and parasitic diseases).

Add all of this up, and you’ll realize that the people of Vermont have legitimate concerns expressed as a singular wish: to know if the product they’re using contains GMO material so they can make a choice whether to buy it or not, for whatever reason. A concern and a wish to which the legislature has listened–a refreshing change in today’s political world. Not only listened, but provided significant funding in defense, too.

Yes, there will be lawsuits. But the people bringing the suits had better bring their A game.

In fact, when it comes to this new law, we all might consider bringing our A game, whether we’re supporting it legally…or fighting it in editorials.

Categories
Legal, Laws, and Regs

Judge strikes blow against groups

Think back on the last donation you made for a cause. Perhaps it was to the Natural Resource Defense Council to aid them in their court battle to protect the Palisades Interstate Park. Maybe it was the Sierra Club, to support its Clean Air Act lawsuit against a Montana coal-fired power plant, or to any organization or individual battling Chevron in its epic, and manic court fight against Ecuadorians, lawyers, journalists, filmmakers, big tech companies, and most US environmentalists.

The donation was made. Your side of the court battle will win, or it won’t. End of story. Or at least, you think it’s the end of the story.

Imagine that eight years after you made the donation, you get a legal letter or subpoena from an intimidating Washington DC law firm representing the coal plant or oil company, informing you you’re going to be deposed and/or forced to appear in court in an ongoing racketeering lawsuit against the organization you supported. Said lawyers will explain that they are seeking co-plaintiffs in their multimillion dollar lawsuit, with an implication underlying the communication that if you’re not with us, you’re agin us.

And all because you donated $10.00 to an organization like the NRDC or the Sierra Club, to support them in their efforts.

Does this sound far-fetched, insane, impossible? Think again, because that’s just what’s happening in the RICO court case brought by Feld Entertainment (parent company of the Ringling Brothers circus) against several animal welfare groups and individuals because of the groups’ legal efforts on behalf of circus elephants.

Magistrate Judge Facciola of the DC district court ordered the animal welfare group defendants (the Humane Society of the US, the Animal Welfare Institute, Born Free USA, and Fund for Animals), to turn over confidential donor lists containing the names and contact information for every person or organization that donated money to the groups to support the then Endangered Species Act (ESA) lawsuit against Ringling Brothers.

From the order:

Accordingly, defendants will have to provide Feld with the names of 1) those donors who received a solicitation and earmarked a donation to support the ESA lawsuit or Rider (or both); and 2) those donors who attended a fund raiser and earmarked a donation in the same way. Donors who neither received a solicitation nor attended a fund raiser cannot possibly have been defrauded and therefore the disclosure of their identities is unnecessary.

By denying the animal welfare groups’ motion for a protective order for the donor information, Judge Facciola is giving permission for Feld Entertainment’s lawyers to contact, and question, these individuals. Feld’s lawyers assert in court documents that those who donated to the animal welfare groups in relation to this court action were defrauded, and would, therefore, be willing to enter the court as co-plaintiffs with Feld Entertainment, owner of Ringling Brothers circus…the organization considered the poster child for circuses with trained elephant acts, the very thing these donors deplore.

Not a problem, you might think, and seemingly Judge Facciola concurs with you. The scenario Facciola seems to have in mind is that Feld’s lawyers will politely have a chit chat with the folks, ask a few questions, get a few replies, and life will go on. And if the donors despise Ringling Brothers as much as I say, these polite chit chats should be short, and to the point.

Real life is never as simple or as black and white as court documents may imply. I have read most of the deposition transcripts from the earlier ESA (Endangered Species Act) case, which Judge Facciola most likely has not. Of course, he hasn’t; he wasn’t the presiding judge in that case. If he had, though, he might come to realize, as I have, that the opinion Judge Sullivan formed about the ESA case was based, for the most part, on out-of-context responses by an unsophisticated man from the Midwest (Tom Rider), under a daunting barrage of questions fired by an intimidating group of high powered Washington DC lawyers. I would like to think that if Judge Facciola did better understand the actual circumstances leading up to Judge Sullivan’s decision—the reality, not the fiction presented by Feld in court documents—he might have paused, just a moment, before subjecting innocent non-party citizens to the same treatment.

I’ve already sent out warnings into the community of those fighting for the welfare of circus elephants about what may be coming their way. I’m not a lawyer, so can’t give advice, but I have stated if I were to receive notice from Feld’s people, I would never appear in a deposition without having a lawyer present—yet another unconscionable burden on people who did nothing more than donate ten bucks eight years ago in order to help circus elephants.

Judge Facciola’s decision was a not a good one—disregarding argument and cavalier as regarding the First Amendment protections due to the non-party donors. That’s the key: he’s disregarded the rights of those not represented in the court room. And by doing so, he’s setting precedent that should seriously worry any group fighting for any cause—whether it be against the Keystone pipeline, for the wolves, in support of safer and healthier food, clean water and air, or circus elephants.

Thankfully, the animal welfare groups are fighting back to the limits set by law. But I worry, I seriously worry, the impact this case can have on any activist group in the future. Particularly after the Chevron court win and the glee with which corporations now consider RICO as both shield and weapon.

Think about it: how willing will you be to donate ten bucks to a cause if it meant you’ll be yanked into court years later?

Categories
Documents Legal, Laws, and Regs

Don’t Mess with one of the E-Discovery Triumvirate

I dabble more than a little in the legal world, but that’s OK, because the legal world dabbles quite heavily in the world of technology. Nowadays, metadata is the smoking gun in court, and e-discovery is the ballistics test that uncovers it.

The concept of e-discovery, or electronic discovery is simple: it is the discovery, identification, and production of electronically stored information (ESI). However, the execution can be involved, complex, and frequently contentious.

Take for example something seemingly simple and benign: the keyword search. If you and I want to find out about something online, we open up Google or Bing and type in some words, such as “e-discovery keyword search”. We typically get back a ton of links, in order of relevancy. We pick and choose from among the links to find what we need. Rarely do we have to go beyond the first few pages to get the information or resources we’re looking for.

In a legal case, though, what keywords are used can trigger a conference between parties, and even hearings with the judge. If there’s too much material produced, both parties may want to refine the keywords; too little material produced, and the parties may question what keywords were used, or whether the use of keywords is even useful.

In a white paper titled Where Angels Fear to Tread: The Problems of Keyword Search in E-Discovery (pdf), the author notes:

The heavy reliance on keyword search in e-discovery places an enormous burden on today’s legal teams. Inconsistencies in language, inefficiencies in search techniques and software user interfaces, which conceal more than reveal, place the attorney in a difficult position: determining what is relevant in a compressed timeline using obsolete tools and tactics. These outdated tools are a key factor behind the spiraling costs and risks associated with e-discovery.

There’s an entire science devoted to keyword searches within the legal community. As for other metadata, oh my goodness, let’s not even get started.

The use of e-discovery was an important component of the Ringling Brothers/animal welfare group Endangered Species Act case (now titled “AWI et al v. Feld Entertainment”). It has continued as an important component of the fees allocation process for this same case.

In a decision that is both unusual and controversial, the judge in the case, Judge Emmet Sullivan, decided that the animal welfare groups should pay attorney fees to Feld Entertainment for the 9+ year court case. After many months, Feld’s lawyers submitted their fee request in a set of filings spanning thousands of pages. (See my copy of the case history, starting with docket number 635.) Not only is the $25 million dollar (and change) fee request large, it’s also been provided in a not useful format: PDF documents with manual redactions, and color coding (example).

The animal welfare groups asked for something a little more useful:

The Fee Petition, which spans at least four-and-a-half four-inch binders, includes nearly two thousand pages of time records and invoices as well as numerous other Excel spreadsheets and tables. The time records and invoices, accounting tens of thousands of attorney and staff hours, are so voluminous that FEI’s paid experts were unwilling to review them. Plaintiffs, unfortunately, do not have the luxury of limiting their review of the time records and invoices to a determination that the “time entries provide level of detail . . . that is typical of appropriate block billing practice,” as Mr. Millian did, see D.I. 664 at 18, or to review only a supposedly “representative sample of litigation activities” limited to three brief periods of time, as Mr. Cohen did, see D.I. 663 at 11-12.5 Rather, Plaintiffs and their experts must scrutinize all of the hours that Feld now seeks to pass on to them.

As Feld’s experts make clear, and as Plaintiffs’ counsel explained to counsel for Feld, this is not a task that can be accomplished by reading the PDF versions of spreadsheets and invoices that Feld included in the Fee petition. It can only be accomplished via computer assisted analysis of the underlying time records using a program such as Microsoft Excel, which will allow Plaintiffs’ counsel and/or experts to (i) sort the data, (ii) perform complex searches within the data, and (iii) mathematically compare time entries across (for example) timekeepers, law firms, and parties to the litigation.

There is no commercially available computer program that can take a PDF of an Excel spreadsheet, much less a PDF of actual invoices, and generate a functioning spreadsheet containing the underlying data. Accordingly, the only way Plaintiffs could independently recreate the time records of Feld’s counsel would be to manually reenter tens of thousands of rows of numbers and text, a process that would take even highly-experienced data entry personnel hundreds to thousands of hours. It would be patently unfair to require Plaintiffs to undertake such an effort to recreate data that Feld’s counsel already have at their fingertips. Moreover, because an analysis of Feld’s billed time is one of the first steps needed to craft Plaintiffs’ response to the Fee Petition, requiring Plaintiffs to replicate Feld’s time records would inject months of needless delay into the fee application process, in addition to creating needless, and substantial, additional expense.

Feld’s lawyer’s response begins with:

Plaintiffs’ second request is for FEI to re-create all of the time entries for Fulbright (JS Ex. 31 and 32), Covington (EG Ex. 1), and Troutman Sanders (“Troutman”) (CA Ex. 2) in
sortable Excel spreadsheets because Plaintiffs say they want to “sort the data” and “perform complex searches.” Mot. at 6-8. These requests should be denied because: (1) the documents do not exist in sortable Excel format, (2) Excel format would not protect FEI’s privilege redactions that Plaintiffs cannot and do not challenge; (3) Excel format would not reflect the color-coding of the exhibits; and (4) FEI is not obligated to undertake the time, effort, and expense of creating new documents, to Plaintiffs’ specifications. It is not necessary for Plaintiffs’ response to the Fee Petition, and if they want to have such charts, they can create them themselves. JS Ex. 32, EG Ex. 1, and CA Ex. 2. These exhibits contain the time entries that were sent as part of invoices to FEI, and were produced to Plaintiffs in .pdf files, which is the same format in which they were sent to the client (or in some cases, the invoices were sent to the client in paper, in which case FEI provided a .pdf to Plaintiffs). The invoices do not, nor have they ever, existed in a sortable Excel format – a fact that FEI’s counsel represented to Plaintiffs. While the .pdf files are not sortable, however, they are word-searchable, as any Adobe document is. But as Plaintiffs themselves argue, there “is no commercially available computer program that can take …. a PDF of actual invoices, and generate a functioning spreadsheet containing the underlying data.” Mot. at 7. So Plaintiffs demand the creation of a document that does not exist, which is a requirement that is non-existent even within normal Rule 26 discovery on the merits of a case, let alone once the case has concluded and is in the final phase of assessing legal fees for frivolous and vexatious litigation.

The legal document goes on for several more pages, with the lawyers expressing increasing umbrage at the animal welfare groups’ request.

If the sheer volume of words and the level of outrage were any influence, a judge might be moved to side with Feld’s lawyer, John Simpson, from Norton Rose Fulbright. But the judge handling the fee allocation, Magistrate Judge John Facciola, isn’t just any judge. He’s one of three judges respectfully known as the e-discovery triumvirate—three men known far and wide for their expertise related to e-discovery.

And Judge Facciola was just a tad skeptical about Feld’s lawyers lamentations:

To that end, I will hold a one day evidentiary hearing, at which I expect knowledgeable representatives, such as billing database managers, from 1) Fulbright, 2) Covington, and 3) Troutman Sanders to be prepared to demonstrate the billing software used during their representation of FEI in the instant action. I also expect the representatives to be prepared to testify to the following issues:

1. Explain and demonstrate live (e.g. not in a PowerPoint presentation but in the actual database) how, within their particular software program(s), an individual timekeeper
makes an entry; what is recorded in that entry; how that entry is saved; who reviews that entry; how that entry is edited or altered for privileges or in an exercise of billing discretion; how that altered entry is saved; and finally, in what format the final bill is sent to the client.

2. Explain why that data saved within their particular software program(s) is NOT, through the use of commercially available software, capable of being converted into a sortable Excel-compatible delimited value spreadsheet format such as comma-separated value (CSV).

3. Explain why, if there exists data that was only saved in a .PDF format, it is NOT, through the use of commercially available software, capable of being converted into a sortable Excel-compatible delimited value spreadsheet format such as comma-separated value (CSV).

A noticeably subdued response indicated that the entries in Excel spreadsheet format would be forthcoming.